Texas Business Court Decision – March 13, 2026
No. 25-BC03A-0012 Go Secure, Inc. v. Crowdstrike, Inc., et al. (Third Division, Judge Andrews) 25-bc03a-0012-gosecure-v-crowdstrike-2026-tex-bus-13.pdf
General and Personal Jurisdiction- Exceptional Case Doctrine. GoSecure, a Delaware company based in California, sued the Crowdstrike defendants, also a Delaware company based in California, alleging the defendants had stolen trade secrets from it in California in 2011 and 2012 and were using these trade secrets in products and services still sold nationally and globally, including in Texas. Plaintiff initially brought the case in California, but dismissed it in August, 2025, and filed this action, asserting both general and specific personal jurisdiction. Defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction, conceding they do business in Texas but arguing that exercising jurisdiction over them would violate federal due process guarantees. The court grants the plea.
Held: (1) the court will decide the issue on the merits rather than on alleged pleading and verification defects;
(2) the court has general jurisdiction over defendants only if their contacts with Texas are so continuous and systematic as to render them “essentially at home” in Texas; typically, a business entity is at home in its place of incorporation and its principal place of business; in an exceptional case, a corporation may be at home in another state when its operations in that other state are so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home there;
(3) under the “nerve-center test,” defendants’ principal place of business is California, where its senior leadership, HR, finance, and research operations are located, not Texas; defendants do not direct, control, or coordinate their business activities from the Austin, Texas office;
(4) defendants’ operations in Texas do not render them at home in Texas under the exceptional-case doctrine; to satisfy the exceptional-case doctrine, a corporation’s activities in Texas must be comparable to a domestic enterprise based in Texas; it is admitted that many of defendants’ executive officers are based in Austin and that defendants do extensive business with Texas customers; but the evidence demonstrates that while its Texas sales are considerable, its Texas sales are minor relative to its activities in their entirety; to rely on the sales to resolve the issue would undermine the nerve-center test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court; while defendants’ activities in Texas may be continuous and systematic in some ways, they are not so continuous and systematic as to render them at home in Texas when Texas is neither their place of incorporation nor their principal place of business;
(5) specific jurisdiction applies when a nonresident defendant engages in some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, and the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to those forum contacts; here, defendants do not contest purposeful availment, and the issue is whether plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to defendants’ purposeful contacts with Texas; to satisfy the “relate to” standard, there must be a substantial connection between those contacts and the operative facts of the litigation;
(6) the court then examines the operative facts of the complaint regarding the misappropriation of the trade secrets and determines they do not substantially relate to the Texas contacts: (a) the trade secrets were created in California between 2004 and 2012, long before defendants opened an office in Texas in 2017; (b) the alleged misappropriation took place in 2011 and 2012 in California, and while it is possible the trade secrets were subsequently used in Texas, in order for the use to be actionable, plaintiff must show the use was unlawful; here, the circumstances under which the trade secrets were obtained and used in defendants’ product all occurred in 2011 and 2012, and the subsequent use of the platform or work on the platform in Texas does not establish a substantial connection between Texas and the operative facts of the case; (c) plaintiff has alleged the injury occurred in California, and any Texas-related damages plaintiff might recover would be minor in comparison to its worldwide damages; (d) with respect to plaintiff’s count alleging conversion, the operative facts for this claim are related to California, where the trade secrets were allegedly developed and improperly obtained; (e) with respect to plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, here, too, the facts relevant to whether plaintiff possessed trade secrets presumably occurred primarily or exclusively in California, as do the facts related to whether defendants took undue advantage of plaintiff.
(7) Based on this analysis, there is not a sufficient basis to establish specific jurisdiction; Texas has little legitimate interest in adjudicating plaintiff’s claims against defendants, while California, where plaintiff initially brought suit, is much more affected by the controversy.
The court lacks personal jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, grants defendants’ special appearance, and dismisses the matter.