Texas Business Court Decision – October 28, 2026

No. 26-BC11A-0097   The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center v. UnitedHealthcare of Texas, Inc. (Eleventh Div., Judge Barnard) 2026 Tex. Bus. 77    26-bc11a-0097-the-univ-of-tex-md-anderson-cancer-center-v-unitedhealthcare-of-texas-2026-tex-bus-77.pdf

Business Court Jurisdiction – Governmental Entities.

Background. MD Anderson, a state university cancer center, sued United Healthcare in the 55th District Court of Harris County for breach of a 1996 Hospital Participation Agreement, seeking more than $315 million in damages. United removed the case to the Business Court under Texas Government Code Sec. 25A.004(d)(1). MD Anderson moved to remand, arguing that, as a state agency, it is a “governmental entity” under Section 25A.001(6), so its claims fall within the exclusion in Sec. 25A.004(g)(1)(A). United did not dispute that MD Anderson was a state agency, arguing instead that the Legislature did not include state agencies in the statutory definition.

Issues:

1. Whether MD Anderson, as a state agency, is a “governmental entity” under Sec. 25A.001(6), which refers to “this state” and its political subdivisions, so that section 25A.004(g)(1)(A) excludes the claim from Business Court jurisdiction.
2. Whether the Legislature’s treatment of state agencies and institutions of higher learning in related statutes, particularly the Fifteenth Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction provision, bears on the meaning of “this state” in Chapter 25A.
3. Whether MD Anderson’s recognized status as a state agency for sovereign-immunity purposes establishes that it is a government entity under Chapter 25A.

Discussion.

Statutory text and structure. The court’s task is to give effect to legislative intent as expressed in the statute’s text, read in the context of the whole statutory framework. Section 25A.001(6) names only “this state” and its political subdivisions. It does not separately name state agencies, boards, university systems, or institutions of higher education. The Legislature does name these entities elsewhere, for example in Government Code Sec. 572.002(10) and Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sec. 101.001(3)(A). The omission warrants consideration, but it does not resolve the dispute because if “this state” already included the State’s constituent agencies, their separate enumeration would not necessarily be required.

Related jurisdiction statutes. Government Code Section 22.220(d)(1), which defines part of the Fifteenth Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction, expressly refers to executive-branch agencies and to university systems and institutions of higher education. The court in Baumgardner v. Brazos River Auth., 714 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. 2025), relied on that express language in holding the Brazos River Authority fell outside the provision. Chapter 25A and Sec. 22.220(d)(1) both govern courts the Legislature created in 2023. The difference in wording is meaningful. Sec. 22.220(d)(1) is persuasive, but not conclusive as to the meaning of “this state” in Chapter 25A.

Sovereign immunity cases. The court distinguishes sovereign immunity cases, because they involved different considerations and do not construe the Section in question; the question of when the state may be sued is not the question here – how jurisdiction is allocated among trial courts.

Conclusion. The court recognizes that the phrase “this state” considered in isolation, could be interpreted broadly enough to encompass governmental institutions through which the state acts. But the statutory language must be defined in context. Here, the Legislature expressly identified the State and its political subdivisions while omitting state agencies and institutions of higher education. In other provisions – including the closely related jurisdictional statute for the Fifteenth Court of Appeals- the Legislature expressly identified those institutions when prescribing the legal consequences applicable to them. That distinction is persuasive. Reading “this state” to include every state agency would extend the definition to a category of entities the Legislature did not expressly include, despite its practice of naming that category in other statutes. MD Anderson is not a “governmental entity” under Sec. 25A.001(6). The governmental exclusion in Sec. 25A.004(g)(1)(A) does not deprive the Business Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.